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national inflation bias can be reduced.  But if there is a precautionary motive for low
average unemployment in order to reduce the utility cost of macroeconomic variability,
there could be more reform in a monetary union.  Labour-market reform to increase
wage flexibility as a substitute for domestic monetary policy and transition costs of
reform are also analysed.  The net effect of monetary union on unemployment is
ambiguous.
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Western Europe has since more than a decade been plagued by high unemployment.  In
this situation, most EU countries will in 1999 enter into a monetary union (EMU) with
a common currency. So it is natural that one of the key concerns in the discussion on
monetary unification in Europe is how unemployment will be affected (see, e.g.,
George, 1997, or Kosters et al., 1998).  The aim of this paper is to help bring more
structure to this discussion.
The conventional wisdom is that asymmetric shocks in a monetary union may lead to
cyclical unemployment, because real exchange-rate changes are more difficult to
achieve when there is no nominal exchange rate that can vary.  This is not the focus
here.  Instead, I analyse the relationship between monetary union and structural
(equilibrium) unemployment.
The motivation for my topic is the consensus that European unemployment is not
cyclical, but reflects structural rigidities.  This has lead to the conclusion that reforms
to improve the functioning of labour markets are required (OECD, 1994; Alogoskoufis
et al, 1995; Lindbeck, 1996; Calmfors et al., 1998).  Many such measures have been
proposed: less generous unemployment insurance, less stringent employment-
protection legislation; less of minimum-wage regulations; changes in the legal
framework for wage bargaining; a larger scope for individual wage contracts as
opposed to collective agreements; more effective active labour-market programmes;
and education efforts to avoid skill mismatches.  This paper focuses on the political-
economy question of how the incentive for such labour-market reform may be changed
by monetary union. As the EU treaty does not provide for a common employment
policy, a key assumption is that labour-market institutions continue to be determined
nationally, even though monetary policy is centralised.
The outline is as follows. Section 1 surveys existing literature of relevance. The
subsequent sections look at four different mechanisms. Section 2 sketches an extended
Barro-Gordon model, in which both monetary policy and labour-market institutions are
determined. Section 3 examines the relationship between employment variability and
the incentive to reduce equilibrium unemployment. Section 4 emphasises the link
between real-wage and money-wage rigidity. Section 5 focuses on the transition from
one set of labour-market institutions to another. Section 6 concludes.2
1. Starting points for the analysis
Although there has been little research on the effects of monetary union on labour-
market institutions, there exist two strands of literature that form relevant starting
points.
The first literature deals with the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy.
Following Kydland and Prescott (1977), and Barro and Gordon (1983a,b), this
research analyses the inflation bias that may exist in a discretionary policy setting. The
bias arises when policy-makers try to achieve an employment goal in excess of the
equilibrium rate.  An important limitation of this literature is that it does not address
the question of how the equilibrium rate of unemployment is determined.
The determination of equilibrium unemployment is, however, the topic of some recent
political-economy research. The key hypothesis is that labour-market rigidities are the
outcome of rational choices by the political majority.  It may be in the interest of
labour to design labour-market institutions in such a way that wages can be raised at
the expense of profits, even though this leads to unemployment (Saint-Paul 1996;
DiTella and MacCulloh, 1996; Fredriksson 1997). Moreover, the interests of
employed insiders and unemployed outsiders are likely to diverge (Saint-Paul 1993,
1995). The former group, which constitutes the political majority, may design labour-
market institutions mainly with the aim of achieving high real wages for itself also
when this hurts the employment prospects of outsiders. So labour-market reform to
reduce unemployment may not be politically viable, because it would reduce the
welfare of the employed majority.
The political-economy literature has usually not dealt with the relationship between
demand-management policies and labour-market rigidities. The models are real models,
where monetary policy and inflation play no role.
To analyse the links between monetary union and equilibrium unemployment, it is
natural to combine these two strands of literature.  Earlier attempts at this have been28
I have extended the Barro-Gordon model of inflation to analyse how monetary union is
likely to affect the amount of labour-market reform.  A key assumption is that labour-
market institutions continue to be determined nationally also when a common
monetary policy is adopted.
In my baseline model, there is more reform outside than inside the monetary union.
The reason is that monetary policy suffers from an inflation bias.  With monetary policy
independence, national labour-market reform reduces this bias in addition to lowering
equilibrium unemployment.  But with a common monetary policy, national reform has
a negligible effect on inflation.
In my second model, I introduce a precautionary motive for labour-market reform.
Variations in inflation and unemployment are regarded as more costly the higher the
average rates of inflation and unemployment.  With an inflation bias, it is unclear how
the precautionary motive affects the relative strength of incentives for reform inside
and outside the EMU.  But if the inflation bias can be eliminated through appropriate
monetary institutions, the incentive for reform becomes stronger inside than outside the
monetary union in this model. The explanation is that the marginal gain of reform to
reduce equilibrium unemployment becomes larger, when monetary policy can no
longer stabilise asymmetric shocks and the variance of unemployment increases.
In my third model, labour-market reform affects both equilibrium unemployment and
wage flexibility.  This adds two effects.  On one hand, the incentive for reform tends to
be stronger inside the monetary union, because there is a need for more wage flexibility
as a substitute for exchange-rate policy.  On the other hand, the incentive for reform
tends to be stronger outside the monetary union to the extent that more wage flexibility
reduces the impact of unanticipated inflation on employment and hence the temptation
to inflate.  In general, it is unclear in this model when the incentive for reform is
stronger. However, there is clearly more reform inside than outside the union, here,
too, if the inflation bias can be eliminated through the choice of appropriate monetary
institutions.
A fourth section analyses an inflation-target regime with no inflation bias.  Here, the
incentive for reform is always stronger outside than inside the monetary union, because29
national labour-market reform will cause downward deviations from the domestic
inflation goal when exchange rates are irrevocably fixed.  If money wages are rigid
downwards, the real-wage reduction necessary to reduce equilibrium unemployment
may also fail to materialise. Outside the union, monetary policy will be pursued in such
a way that the domestic inflation goal is always met.
My conclusion that joining the monetary union could weaken the incentive for labour-
market reform follows from the assumption that reform is not co-ordinated between
member states.  But one could argue that a common monetary policy would strengthen
the incentive for centralisation of employment policy.  One reason is that the effects on
aggregate inflation can be internalised in this way.  The common monetary policy can
also be used to facilitate reform, if it is co-ordinated among the members of the
monetary union.  Moreover, EU agreements on impopular - but effective - employment
measures might serve as a commitment technology increasing the costs of abstaining
from labour-market reform (very much as ERM participation represented a
commitment technology for monetary policy in some EU countries in the 1980s).
Nevertheless, there is little to suggest that there will be substantial centralisation of
labour-market policy in the EU in the foreseeable future.  Labour-market institutions
seem usually to be regarded as belonging to the core of national decision-making.  Nor
is it clear, when going beyond my model, that such centralisation is necessarily
beneficial.  The uncertainty about the optimal portfolio of policies against
unemployment represents a strong case for allowing different countries to experiment
in different ways.  Differences in the relative importance of asymmetric versus
symmetric shocks or in the impact of the common monetary policy could also explain
why the need for labour-market reform could differ between member states in a
monetary union.
My overall conclusion is that monetary union will affect the incentive for labour-
market reform in several ways, but that the net effect is ambiguous.  This suggests the
need for looking at actual country experiences. Unfortunately, these are very diverse.
One one hand, labour-market institutions in the U.S., which is a large currency union,
seem to be conducive to low unemployment.  On the other hand, the pace of labour-
market reform in the 1980s and 1990s has been very slow in most EU economies30
pursuing hard-currency policies within the ERM of the same type as expected in the
EMU.  This applies to Belgium, France and Germany, although the Netherlands is an
exception.  The most far-reaching labour-market reforms in the OECD during the last
two decades have been achieved in Britain and New Zealand without any pressures
from international monetary arrangements (OECD, 1997).31
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Figure 1: The marginal loss of unemployment
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